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COMMENTARY
On Critical Legal Studies As Guerrilla Warfare
GUYORA BINDER*
'TT]o be on the march is also a form of fighting, and to avoid combat at a
given moment is another form. " -Che Guevara'
Critical legal studies represents the first systematic effort to gain legitimacy
for leftist scholarship and teaching in American law schools. In an effort to
deny that legitimacy, more conservative scholars and public officials have
begun to characterize critical legal studies as dangerous,2 potentially violent,
3
and on at least one occasion, as a form of "guerrilla warfare."'4 Skeptical that
the quest for legitimacy is consistent with true radicalism, some leftist law-
yers and scholars have begun to complain that critical legal studies is harm-
less and ineffectual.5
Because these criticisms are contradictory, they pose exactly the sort of
intellectual problem we critical legal scholars most like to think about: How
is it possible that these contradictory characterizations of critical legal stud-
ies can both seem true? On the other hand, these criticisms pose exactly the
sort of political problem that we critical legal scholars don't like to think
about: Are we in fact so dangerous to the social order that we will be
squashed? Alternatively, is the price of our survival our complete co-opta-
tion by the social order? This essay attempts to answer these questions. It
offers an account of critical legal studies that incorporates both contradictory
characterizations. It argues that even if critical legal scholars are not quite
the guerrillas that its more conservative critics fear, critical legal studies nev-
ertheless is more like guerrilla warfare than skeptics on the left will allow.
What does the phrase "guerrilla warfare" call to mind? Latin American
peasants, bandolier-swaddled and barefoot, bayonets clenched betweeen their
teeth, carrying rusty muskets down rain-forested ravines to torch haciendas,
determined, whether by the sword or the plow, to live off the land. Of course
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1977, Princeton; J.D. 1980,
Yale. This essay benefited from the comments and suggestions of Alan Freeman, George Kannar,
Errol Meidinger, Betty Mensch, Judy Olin, John Schlegel, and, especially, Rob Steinfeld. Errors of
fact and politics are mine alone.
1. CHE GUEVARA SPEAKS 88 (G. Lavan ed. 1967). Che Guevara has also published under the
name of and is often referred to as Ernesto Guevara.
2. Eastland, Radicals in the Law Schools, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 16, col. 4.
3. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413, 437-38
(1984).
4. "[M]ore traditional professors.., contend that the faculty 'crits' are waging 'guerilla warfare'
at the law school." Lacayo, Critical Legal Times at Harvard, TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 87.
5. See infra notes 10, 12-13 (criticizing ineffectiveness of critical legal studies).
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the CIA can train the cast of Miami Vice to do this sort of thing, but ordina-
rily we will think of a leftist insurgency carried on by, you know, "the
masses." Roberto Unger evoked this kind of imagery when he characterized
critical legal studies as a social "movement exemplifying a form of trans-
formative action .... -6 Yet most readers familiar with this "movement"
attributed Unger's romantic characterization to revelation-a research
method at which he is adept 7-rather than observation.
By contrast, what does the phrase "critical legal studies" conjure up for
most of us? Leftists, to be sure, but hardly "the masses." Critical legal
scholars are privileged people and graduates of elite institutions by and large.
They can afford to lavish attention upon their toddlers and their therapists
and to wear the most expensive clothes they feel comfortable in. They would
sooner unpack a premise than pack a pistol. They publish rather than perish.
They have a high rate of literacy. Have they anything in common with rug-
ged hillfolk beyond a taste for goatcheese? Some would say that likening
oppressed campesinos to these spoiled yuppies only adds insult to injury.
That is not to say that the guerrillas of our video imagination are disquali-
fied by graduate degrees. Twenty years ago, the psychedelic visage of Che
Guevara, brooding through the purple haze, was a ubiquitous reminder that
there were leftist intellectuals willing to lay down their lives for a cause. In
his highly literate essays and speeches, Guevara stressed the importance of
the practical activity-and the risk-of collective armed struggle as a prereq-
uisite to the personal transformation necessary for citizenship in the new so-
ciety. "The revolutionary makes the revolution," ran one of his aphorisms,
"and the revolution makes the revolutionary."8 Guevara's theory of revolu-
tionary change commanded unusual political credibility, because it impelled
him to action and risk on behalf of others.9 At the same time it commanded
6. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 665 (1983). But see
infra text accompanying note 38 (revolution unlikely in industrialized West).
7. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 295 (1975) ("But our days pass, and still we do
not know you fully. Why then do you remain silent? Speak God.").
8. The Philosophy of Che Guevara (Center for Cassette Studies 1965) (taped inverview with Che
Guevara), quoted in S. LIss, MARXIST THOUGHT IN LATIN AMERICA 259 (1984). For examples of
Guevara's thinking on the relationship between armed struggle and political transformation, see C.
GUEVARA, GUERILLA WARFARE (1985) (collection of essays by Guevara and others); C.
GUEVARA, SOCIALISM AND MAN IN CUBA AND OTHER WORKS (1968) [hereinafter C. GUEVARA,
SOCIALISM]. For a brilliant, imaginative reconstruction of Guevara's own personal transformation,
see J. CANTOR, THE DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA (1983) (novel quoting extensively from Guevara's
Bolivian diaries). A useful introduction to Guevara's thought in its indigenous context is provided
in S. LISS, supra.
9. "I believe in armed struggle as the only solution for those peoples who fight to free themselves,
and I am consistent with my beliefs. Many will call me an adventurer, and that I am-only one of a
different sort, one of those who risks his skin to prove his truths." CHE GUEVARA SPEAKS, supra
note 1, at 142 frontispiece.
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unusual intellectual credibility because it was rooted in experience. It was, in
this sense, empirically tested.
Recently, the political and intellectual credibility of critical iegal studies
has been questioned precisely because it lacks these attributes. This criticism
often comes from lawyers and legal scholars who share some of the discon-
tent expressed by critical legal scholars.
One frequently voiced complaint is that critical legal scholars, while com-
plaining that their society is fundamentally unjust, do nothing to change it.
Few of the scholars most prominently associated with critical legal studies
engage in litigation, organize communities, develop legislative proposals, or
advise campaigns.10 Their law review articles seldom offer novel legal argu-
ments usable in court, specific policy proposals, or even vague prescriptions
for a better society. So much is true of subway graffiti, which comes in for
more than its fair share of criticism;" but what makes the handiwork of
critical legal scholars so much more galling is that they have so much less
than subway artists to complain about, while being so much better positioned
to do something about their complaints. After all, they belong to a profes-
sion that has traditionally wielded considerable influence and sometimes
sought to achieve social reform by legal means. A recent piece in the New
Republic suggested that critical legal scholars might be worse than useless:
Not only do they do little to redress inequality, but as relatively privileged
members of society, they may be part of the problem.12 These suspicions are
regularly grumbled by the underpaid public interest lawyers invited to criti-
cal legal studies conferences for the purpose of allaying such suspicions. 13
When Duncan Kennedy, the Grand Dragon of critical legal studies, decided
to spend his sabbatical year teaching at a less established law school and
counseling indigent clients, cynics imagined that he was more concerned
with public relations than with the public interest.
10. Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding
Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 238 (1984); Schwartz, supra note 3, at
421; Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509, 552-67 (1984).
11. Glazer, On Subway Graffiti in New York, 54 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1979) (criticizing graffiti as
manifestation of uncontrolled behavior and evaluating proposals for controlling graffiti).
12. Menand, Radicalism for Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1986, at 20, 23. For a commen-
tary cast in a less ingenuous vein, see Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be Radical?, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 264 (1984) ("The obvious Marxist explanation of the CLS movement is that it permits a
few harmless academic leftists to adopt a radical pose, while receiving good salaries and excellent
fringe benefits for serving the interests of the capitalists."); White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal
Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649, 671-72 (1984) (asserting that self-preservation retards transforma-
tive process).
13. Some of the tensions between legal academics and public interest practitioners, evident at any
critical legal studies meeting, are alluded to in Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated,
and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 399-
402, 410 (1984), as well as in Sparer, supra note 10, at 511.
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If the Critics' 14 political credentials have sometimes been questioned by
leftist lawyers, their intellectual credentials have sometimes been questioned
by other leftist scholars. Many have complained about the legal doctrine
that dominates the attention of most legal scholars, but some skeptics have
noted that the Critics are just as inclined as conventional legal scholars to
overestimate the importance of legal doctrine. 15 The three complaints about
legal doctrine most often associated with critical legal scholars are that it's
indeterminate, that it's a tool for legitimating injustice, and that it's ideologi-
cal. Skeptics on the left (hereinafter the "left skeptics") have questioned all
three of these complaints.
By arguing that legal doctrine is indeterminate, Critics mean that it cannot
decide cases-that its rules, when applied to controversies, do not compel
determinate results.16 To this claim, Marxist sociologists of law have re-
sponded that the legal rules of a capitalist society quite predictably advance
the interests of its ruling class. 17 That a lawyer can always come up with a
clever argument doesn't change the fact that a regime of private property
protects the interests of property owners. While legal doctrine may not logi-
cally compel particular results, in its social context it may yield predictable
results. 18 Legal doctrine, then, is essentially determinate since it is deter-
mined by class interest.
14. I use "Critics" or "Critical" to refer to critical legal scholars or to characterize their princi-
ples and ideas. I use "critics" or "critical" to refer to those who criticize critical legal scholars.
15. See Munger & Seron, Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal Theory: A Comment On
Method, 6 LAW & POL'Y 257, 260-79 (1984) (explicit parallel between conventional legal scholar-
ship and critical legal studies); cf Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiri-
cism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 576, 579-88 (1984) (discussing debate over value of empiricism).
16. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 377-79 (1973) (criticizing attempts to
legitimize coercive power of judges).
17. See Schlegel, supra note 13, at 397 (citing alliance between critical Marxism and scientific
Marxism since both stress that material culture emphasized in determining content of law). This
viewpoint is frequently attributed to M. HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 (1977) and G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963).
18. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 462,
484-88 (1987). Of course it is not clear whether this predictability of legal decisionmaking is attrib-
utable to legal doctrine rather than to the social context in which we find it. Moreover, it is not
always clear that the legal decisionmaking has a predictable impact on the world rather than a
predictable impact on the way the world is described. If the latter, then the claim that property law
protects the wealthy is a tautology rather than an empirical judgment. As Robert Gordon argues,
"Banality becomes pure tautology when the functionalist claim is reduced to one that the legal
system responded to the needs of capitalism with rules securing to individuals large bundles of
exclusion/exploitation/alienation rights that could be traded in markets because such a legal regime
is one of the main characteristics most people use to define capitalism." Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 82-83 (1984) (emphasis in original). If legal decisionmaking serves
more to describe rather than create the distribution of wealth, then the strongest claim that one can
make for its service to the interests of the wealthy is that it legitimates their wealth by calling it
property.
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In saying that legal d6ctrine is indeterminate, Critics do not mean that it
makes no difference. To the contrary, they seem to think that legal doctrine
is very important. They think that legal doctrine helps perpetuate injustice
by providing justifications for it. This is how many people have understood
the Critics' complaints that legal doctrine "legitimates" injustice. 19 In a re-
cent article; however, Marxist labor law scholar Alan Hyde argues that such
claims lack empirical support: opinion polls, he notes, belie the claim that
people disadvantaged by the legal system perceive it as just.20
A Critical defense of the legitimation thesis would surely involve broaden-
ing its focus. Legal doctrine, the Critic might say, perpetuates injustice not
by increasing popular support for the legal system per se, but by helping to
maintain allegiance toward the society as a whole. It does this, the Critic
would argue, by invoking and honoring values widely, and falsely, attributed
to that society. In other words it is one expression, but by no means the sole
source, of a hegemonic or all-pervasive ideology. 21 Thus, even if some people
perceive the courts as failing to live up to the ideals enunciated by legal doc-
trine, their perceptions of the courts as unfair may be etched against a back-
ground image of a fundamentally fair society: for example, "everybody
knows the courts are owned by (the rich, the landlords, the welfare depart-
ment, the cops, the whites); you can't expect them to listen to a poor
(schmuck, screw-up) like me." If some empirical studies have shown that
deprived people mistrust the courts, other empirical studies have shown de-
prived people mistrusting themselves, blaming themselves for their own dep-
rivation.22 Predictably, though, no such empirical studies have been
performed by critical legal scholars. 23
Because the notion of hegemonic ideology employed by critical legal schol-
19. E.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1049-57 (1978).
20. Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379, 406-12.
21. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 109-24 (evaluating historical evidence that laws shaped by
ideology); Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281, 284-92 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982) (same).
22. See generally 0. LEWIS, LA VIDA xiii-lii (1966) (describing "culture of poverty"); E.
LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER (1967) (unemployed lower economic class blames itself for poverty); R.
SENNETT & J. COBB, THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS (1973) (analyzing psychological response of
working class to life situations).
23. Some work in social history that has influenced critical legal studies is empirical: for exam-
ple, E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1972); Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,
in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 113
(1975); but it would be disingenuous to claim this work as critical legal study. Some work by
critical legal scholars has offered phenomenological description of the psychic effects of power: for
example, West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); P. Gabel, Ontological
Passivity and the Constitution of Otherness Within Large-Scale Social Networks: The Bank Teller
(1981) (unpublished manuscript); but such work has seldom presented empirical support for its
claims, even in the form of personal experience.
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ars has not emerged from empirical study, some otherwise sympathetic
scholars have suspected that it is conceptually fuzzy. In a recent article,
liberal legal scholar Don Brosnan compared critical legal studies unfavorably
to recent Marxist theory, arguing that the work of critical legal scholars gen-
erally fails to explain how ideological false consciousness is produced by, or
otherwise related to, material conditions.24 Because they fail to explain how
false consciousness arises, critical legal scholars cannot explain how it can be
eliminated. To the extent that such "ideology" is "hegemonic," it seems even
more unassailable. If "ideology" deludes everyone in our society, how is a
critique of ideology possible? The difficulty this poses for radical scholars is
political as well as intellectual: If ideology sustains an unjust society, to the
extent that that ideology is invincible, eliminating injustice seems impossible.
It is difficult to maintain a posture as a radical scholar without believing in
the possibility of radical social change. Brosnan has suggested that the Crit-
ics' lack of a theory of radical social change may explain their failure to offer
or implement a concrete program.25 In a similar vein, Canadian observers
Alan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan speculate that the lack of a psycho-
logical theory of personal transformation hobbles the Critics in designing any
transformative practice.26 Perhaps the Critics fail Guevara's standard for
political activism because they lack his theory of social change-although
Guevara, no doubt, would have reversed the causation. Good theory, he
might have said, looks into the barrel of a gun.
The manifest differences between Che Guevara and, say, Mark Kelman 27
make it all the more interesting that some observers have likened critical
legal studies to guerrilla warfare. While leftists of various hues have scored
critical legal scholars for making so little difference, conservatives-and even
liberals-have seen them as downright dangerous. 28 To some, their rise to
24. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 262-68 (1986).
25. Id.
26. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 10, at 239-42. Hutchinson and Monahan suggest that
developing individual autonomy requires relations of intimacy that capitalism impedes, but they
offer no suggestions for a practice aimed at transforming either capitalist social conditions or the
hobbled personalities that inhabit those conditions. Guevara, by contrast, offers guerrilla warfare as
a practice aimed at disrupting those conditions while developing both the personal autonomy and
collective commitment of the practitioners. For further discussion of models of personal and social
transformation compatible with critical legal studies, see Binder, Beyond Criticism (forthcoming in
Summer, 1988, University of Chicago Law Review).
27. "I never really claimed to be a good organizer anyway; in fact, I suspect that I'm a lousy one.
I actually believe that the crudest Marxist sociology can adequately account for that: I am an
isolated bourgeois academic, removed from daily struggles, etc. etc." Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 293, 346 (1984).
28. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 437-39 (critical legal studies endorses coercion and violence); id. at
448-52 (critical legal studies makes irresponsible proposals); id at 454 (critical legal studies endorses
violence).
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prominence has heralded the collapse of the rule of law,29 Western civiliza-
tion,3° and-worst of all-the Harvard Law School. 31 One of the most con-
troversial of these Jeremiads was by Dean Paul Carrington of the Duke Law
School. In his eyes, critical legal scholars are insurgents, undermining the
mission of the law schools from within and corrupting the characters of in-
cipient lawyers. What makes his characterization of the problem so interest-
ing is his proposed solution to it. Critical legal scholars, he opined, have a
moral duty to depart the law school, to attack it from without. 32 Thus he
objects less to the Critics' attack on legal doctrine than to what he perceives
as their surreptitious way of waging it. This objection is reminiscent of the
complaints made by imperial officers that native rebels don't fight like gentle-
men because they disdain uniforms and hide behind trees. To "hide" among
a population that an occupying army is determined not only to civilize, but
also to "civilianize," has always seemed to Westerners as the depth of cow-
ardice. This hiding is said to be one of the distinguishing features of terror-
ism-and of guerrilla warfare. 33
Thus the skeptics of both the right and the left seem to agree on two fea-
tures of critical legal studies: that it is cowardly, and that it is deceptive.
According to the left skeptics, critical legal scholars posture as dangerous
revolutionaries while remaining harmless, safe, and well fed. According to
skeptics on the right, critical legal scholars posture as harmless laborers in
the vineyards, while secretly being dangerous revolutionaries. What are we
to make of all this?
29. Eastland, supra note 2.
30. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-
TION 33-41 (1983) (legal formalism and distinction between law and politics essential to Western
legal tradition; attacks on these ideas, especially as articulated by Roberto Unger, symptomatic of
breakdown of this tradition); id. at 590 n.88 (Duncan Kennedy's interpretation of contract doctrine
in terms of conflict of irreconcilable values symptomatic of collapse of Western legal tradition). But
see Binder, Angels and Infidels: Hierarchy and Historicism in Medieval Legal History, 35 BUFFALO
L. REV. 527-30 (1986) (describing and criticizing Berman's analysis of critical legal studies).
31. See Lacayo, supra note 4, at 87 (discussing difficulty in recruiting professors at Harvard Law
School because of political infighting).
32. See Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) ("nihilism," as
exemplified by Roberto Unger and others in critical legal studies movement, could encourage future
lawyers to engage in bribery and intimidation; nihilists "have an ethical duty to depart the law
school"). Louis Schwartz expresses a similar sentiment: "Every faculty should have one Ken-
nedy-certainly no more than one and most certainly not one of the solemn acolytes." Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 419. But see "Of Law and the River, " and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 19-20 (1985) (letter from Louis B. Schwartz to Paul Brest) (disclaiming implica-
tion that number of nihilist professors should be restricted other than for reasons of academic quali-
fications). Interestingly, when Brest characterized Carrington's position as a threat to academic
freedom, Philip Johnson objected that Brest was effectively hiding behind the liberal principle repu-
diating political tests for academic employment, which Johnson assumed critical legal scholars had
rejected. Id. at 16-17 (letter from Paul Brest to Philip E. Johnson); id. at 18-19 (letter from Phillip
E. Johnson to Paul Brest).
33. J.T. JOHNSON, THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 66-69 (1981)
1987]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
I argue here that both of these characterizations are largely correct, but
that there is more truth than justice in them. In other words, I admit here
that there is much timidity and equivocation in critical legal studies, but nev-
ertheless I defend critical legal scholars. In particular, I argue that leftist
scholars and practitioners have unfairly attacked critical legal studies be-
cause they have been successfully deceived as to the true intentions of critical
legal scholars-more deceived than right-wing opponents of critical legal
studies have been. I admit that this deception is the product of excessive
caution on the part of critical legal scholars, but I defend that caution as
excusable under the circumstances. Because left skeptics have not under-
stood how potentially dangerous critical legal studies could be to the status
quo, they have also not seen how dangerous the status quo could be to criti-
cal legal scholars. 34
Let me review the left skeptics' characterization of critical legal studies,
and then explain how I think that characterization is mistaken. The left
skeptic complains that critical legal scholars fail as leftist intellectuals be-
cause: (1) they do no empirical research into the origins of injustice; (2) (as a
result) they have no theory of social change; (3) (as a result) they have no
political program; and, (4) (as a result) they engage in no political activity
(which in turn precludes opportunities for empirical observation). I argue,
by contrast, that critical legal scholars: (1) have a theory of social change;
(2) (that is) sufficiently rooted in experience; (3) (that they) implement; but
only (4) to the extent that its implementation involves little risk.
What is the theory of social change that I attribute to critical legal studies?
It is essentially the same theory of social change that I outline at the begin-
ning of this essay, and that I attribute to Che Guevara: Social change can
only be achieved through confrontation-that is, a collective commitment to
risk repressive violence, either through disobedience or violent resistance. 35
Now, the analogy that I propose between critical legal studies and guer-
34. Despite the relatively low tenure standards of American law schools, an alarming number of
impressive critical legal scholars are being fired from law teaching positions. See generally Gordon,
Law and Ideology, 3 TIKKUN 14 (1988) (recent firings at Harvard, New England, and Rutgers-
Camden).
35. Guevara advocated the operation of mobile guerrilla bands in rural areas, anticipating that
their operation would provoke indiscriminate repressive violence throughout the region. "The dic-
tatorship constantly tries to function without resorting to force. Being obliged to appear ... in its
true aspect as a violent dictatorship of the reactionary classes will contribute to its unmasking, and
this will deepen the struggle to such an extent that it will not be able to turn back." CHE GUEVARA
SPEAKS, supra note 1, at 82. While the repressive violence would convince the peasants that they
had little to lose by resisting, the courage and success of the guerrillas would convince them that
they had much to gain. Guevara "knew that Latin Americans saw the objective conditions for
revolution-poverty, hunger, oppression-and believed that the subjective conditions-cognizance
of the possibility of victory-could emerge only by engaging in armed struggle." S. Liss, supra note
8, at 258.
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rilla movements is open to misconstruction. After all, critical legal scholars
don't even seem militant, let alone military. And even on the assumption
that Critics believe or engage in civil disobedience, the reader may fairly ob-
ject that nonviolent resistance is not violent resistance. Am I really sug-
gesting that critical legal studies intends to change society by putting a gun to
its head? Do critical legal scholars really wish to seize the state apparatus by
armed force? Yet the analogy to guerrilla movements will seem strained only
if the reader is unwilling to accept the limitations I impose upon it or to
accept my idiosyncratic interpretation of guerrilla movements. So before
comparing critical legal studies to guerrilla movements, I should clarify what
I am not saying about critical legal studies, what I am assuming about guer-
rilla movements, and why I am willing to court misconstruction by compar-
ing the two. Accordingly, lest I appear to be marketing critical legal studies
under false pretences, I offer these warnings on the label.36
First, I am not saying that critical legal studies is guerrilla warfare. All I
am saying is that the two practices share the same theory of social change.
And, according to this theory, warfare is not always an appropriate means of
pursuing social change. As Sheldon Liss comments, Guevara "realized that
where a government had come to power through any form of popular consul-
tation, fraudulent or not, and maintained at least a facade of constitutional-
ity, it is exceedingly difficult to precipitate a civil war since the possibilities
for civil struggle have not been exhausted. ' 37 Roberto Unger agrees that
armed revolution is unlikely in the industrialized West, because "mass-party
politics" and mass culture obscure conflict, and because "brutal tyrannies"
which might provoke universal resistance "do not exist in the industrialized
West," while the "repressive apparatus" of the state is unlikely to be dis-
rupted by military conflict with other states. "As the mechanisms and occa-
sions of revolution disappear, we seem to be left with nothing but the petty
squabbles of routine politics." '38
Now the mere fact that guerrilla warriors and critical legal scholars may
agree that guerrilla warfare is inappropriate in the industrialized West does
not mean that the two groups share a theory of social change. It may be that
guerrilla warriors would view their own theory, as well as their own practice
of social change, as inapplicable in Western society; and it may be that criti-
cal legal scholars seek to develop a theory of social change peculiar to West-
ern society. Thus third world revolution is commonly identified in American
popular culture with the coup d'etat-an attempt on the part of a military
band to seize control of the apparatus of the state by force-while critical
legal scholars such as Unger reject a conception of politics "narrowly under-
36. And not in fine print, either.
37. S. LIss, supra note 8, at 261.
38. Unger, supra note 6, at 670-71.
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stood as the contest over the control of the state."'3 9 Accordingly, a reader
who shares the popular image of guerrilla movements described above will
have difficulty accepting the suggestion that critical legal scholars and guer-
rilla warriors share even a theory of social change.
In consequence, I offer a second warning on the label "guerrilla warfare."
In using this term, I reject its popular association with the coup d'etat.40
Accordingly, I do not see guerrilla warfare as premised on the assumption
that control of the state is a necessary precondition to social change. In addi-
tion, I see violence as playing a secondary role in the guerrilla's theory of
social change and coercion next to no role at all.
Although willing to fight, Guevara did not believe that meaningful social
change could be accomplished through coercion. Rather, it would only oc-
cur through the personal transformation and collective commitment of the
masses. Thus the primary goal of the guerrilla movements he envisioned and
inspired 41 was not to seize the apparatus of the state-indeed, this goal, if
realized prematurely, would involve no meaningful social change at all42 -
but to politicize ordinary people and inspire them with the courage to
resist.4 3
Guerillas inspired by Guevara expected to transform ordinary people in
four ways. First, by living among oppressed people and sharing their pov-
erty, the guerrillas hoped to encourage such people to respect and identify
with the guerrillas. Second, by offering assistance-medical care, help at
harvest time, famine relief, land reform in regions they controlled-the guer-
39. Id. at 672.
40. This perception of guerrilla movements in American popular culture is a direct reflection of
the way American officials portray these movements. See Loveman & Davies, Introduction: Revolu-
tionary Theory and Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, in C. GUEVARA, supra note 8, at
20-21 (American officials characterize such movements as "international vandalism," "threats" to
the "national independence" of third world countries, and warn of the consequences for world
peace if successful guerrilla movements are accepted as legitimate governments). By contrast,
Guevara is at pains to distinguish popular guerrilla movements emanating from "the masses" from
reformist coups d'etat that eliminate a repressive leader without democratizing the structure of
power. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare: A Method, in C. GUEVARA, supra note 8, at 189-90; see
Guevara, Message to the Tricontinental, in C. GUEVARA, supra note 8, at 207 (distinguishing popu-
lar upheavals from army putsches).
41. Guevara influenced guerrilla movements in Latin America through his writings, particularly
Guerrilla Warfare, by the example he set with his exploits during the Cuban revolution, his personal
involvement in guerrilla movements (as in Bolivia in the mid-1960s), and, possibly, by his training
of guerrilla leaders. See generally Loveman & Davies, Case Histories of Guerrilla Movements and
Political Change, in C. GUEVARA, supra note 8, at 214 (discussing Latin America guerrilla move-
ments). For a discussion of Guevara's influence on the Sandinista movement, see id. at 353, 359,
362-65.
42. See Loveman & Davies, supra note 41, at 405 (emphasizing creating conditions for revolution
rather than simply setting goal of military victory by Salvadoran guerrillas).
43. Loveman & Davies, supra note 41, at 404 (assessing Salvadoran guerrillas); Loveman & Da-
vies, supra note 40, at 4-5 (assessing Guevara).
GUERRILLA WARFARE
rillas hoped to win the trust and friendship of victims of government neglect
or repression.44 Third, by attacking the government while remaining an elu-
sive target, the guerrillas anticipated that they would provoke further gov-
ernment repression against the populace. The guerrillas hoped that such
government repression would further alienate the populace from the govern-
ment and would persuade the people that they had little to gain by acquiesc-
ing in their own oppression.45 Finally, by surviving government repression,
the guerrillas hoped to win the people's admiration and to persuade them
that self-defense need not be as costly as they feared.
Guevara dared guerrillas to gamble that identification with and admiration
for their struggle, fear and hatred of a repressive government, and, perhaps, a
sense of little to lose, would impel some of the oppressed to join the guerrilla
movement. The experience of risking one's life for a cause while obeying the
guerrilla's code of service to the people would, according to Guevara, forge a
new socialist humanity.46 Violent resistance was for Guevara what nonvio-
lent resistance was for Gandhi-a quasi-religious discipline requiring
humility aimed at self-transcendence. 47 The resulting revolution would take
place neither on the battlefield nor on the books, but in the hearts and minds
of the revolutionaries. As a consequence, risk and commitment were more
important in Guevara's theory of social change than violence or coercion.
Although Guevara's program obviously involves using violence against the
government, the premise of the program is that violence is not introduced by
the guerrillas. Rather, Guevara presupposes that an oppressive state survives
only by threatening or employing violence all the time; armed resistance is
thus a form of legitimate self-defense.4 8  The most coercive, exploitative as-
pect of this program consists of its willingness to provoke repressive violence
against others in order to compel a choice; however, even then the program
compels a choice between two sides rather than adherence to one or the
other.
Moreover, this same coercive situation can result from "nonviolent" strat-
egies and can contribute to their success in inspiring further resistance. Soci-
ety is so constructed that no one can make herself a target of repression
44. C. GUEVARA, supra note 8, at 65, 79-80, 129; Loveman & Davies, supra note 41, at 286
'(philosophy of guerrillas in Colombia).
45. C. GUEVARA, supra note 8, at 127 (acknowledging that repressive measures impoverish peas-
antry); Guevara, supra note 40, at 186-87 (violence provokes repressive government to drop its
mask of legality); Loveman & Davies, supra note 41, at 227, 377, 381 (repressive counterinsurgency
measures in Guatemala and Nicaragua built support for guerrilla movements).
46. See Loveman & Davies, supra note 40, at 7, 11.
47. C. GUEVARA, SOCIALISM, supra note 8, at 79.
48. Guevara, supra note 40, at 187; Loveman & Davies, supra note 40, at 16 (quoting Venezuelan
guerrilla Douglas Bravo); Loveman & Davies, supra note 41, at 278 (quoting Tenth Congress of
Colombian Communist party).
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without endangering those physically, emotionally, or politically closest to
her. Granted, the nonviolent resister courageously presents herself as a target
for repression rather than melting into the crowd, but can she evade respon-
sibility when witnesses to her bravery become victims of repression as well?
And while she may prefer that these victims join her in martyrdom, can she
express surprise when they raise their hands in self-defense? I do not equate
guerrilla warfare with civil disobedience, but I do insist that violence is less
central in theory to the former and more important in practice to the latter
than is commonly supposed.
I am aware that the understanding of guerrilla movements I ask the reader
to accept is unconventional, and, as a consequence, my comparison of critical
legal studies with the theoretical foundation for guerrilla warfare almost in-
vites misinterpretation. Accordingly, this comparison requires a third warn-
ing: I make this comparison in order to make a point about guerrilla warfare
as well as about critical legal studies. I identify the two not only in order to
suggest that critical legal studies is more engaged and subversive than is com-
monly supposed, but also to present guerrilla movements as worthy of more
respect than they are commonly accorded. In particular, I wish to show that
guerrilla movements share much with popular movements for social change
that have been accepted as legitimate in this country, and that their partici-
pants act on the basis of beliefs shared by eminent scholars in this country. I
stress this point because I believe that the popular image of guerrilla move-
ments as coercive rather than persuasive is not only wrong but also destruc-
tive. In particular, it is destructive of popular social movements abroad in so
far as it justifies coercive repression of these movements as a routine response
in kind, within a squabble between military elites or their superpower sup-
porters. Even if we critical legal scholars are unable to raise our hands in
defense of such movements, we must raise our voices. No doubt we could
credibly preserve our own respectability by distinguishing ourselves from vi-
olent movements for social change, just as we have (although somewhat less
credibly) sought respectability by maintaining a cautious distance from
Marxism. Unfortunately, the price of such respectablility may be paid by
Marxist popular movements abroad. These movements are faced with brutal
repression in part because they lack legitimacy within our culture, while law
professors can probably afford to shed a little of the legitimacy our culture
accords us.
Now this is not meant to imply that the analogy I am drawing between
critical legal studies and guerrilla warfare is nothing more than a rhetorical
posture-a gesture of support for revolutionary struggles in Central America
or South Africa. Within the limits and accepting the assumptions I have
stated, there is a great deal of truth in the analogy. Granted, critical legal
scholarship concerns civil rather than military struggle, yet such scholarship
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often implies that civil struggle is futile, its possibilities exhausted.49 Despite
the difference in terrain and rhetoric, the writings of critical legal scholars,
like the efforts of Guevara, point toward confrontation with its attendant risk
of repressive violence. The major difference is that critical legal scholars
seem unwilling to take the risk. They are "Guevarists" but not Guevaras,
"guerrillists" but not guerrillas.
"But," the left skeptic will respond, "what you are dismissing as the 'only
difference' between critical legal scholars and Che Guevara is a mortal differ-
ence! What gave Guevara's theory intellectual as well as political credibility
was that he insisted on testing it in practice, whereas our skepticism about
critical legal studies is based on its lack of empirical support. Because of this
lack of empirical support we are also skeptical that the Critics' critique of
legal doctrine really is tied to any theory of social change."
My response is twofold. First, critical legal studies is rooted in experi-
ence-that is, the particular historical experience of the generation that pro-
duced it. Second, critical legal studies requires little empirical support
because it bases its theory of social change on assumptions widely prevalent
in our political culture.
What do I mean by saying that critical legal studies is rooted in the histori-
cal experience of the generation that produced it? I mean that it has been
profoundly shaped by participation in, or (more often) observation of, three
political movements: the civil rights movement of the early and mid-sixties,
the antiwar movement of the late sixties and early seventies, and the black
power movement of the same era. I do not include the still vibrant women's
movement as a principal source of critical legal studies, even though it has
influenced the thinking of many (mostly female) critical legal scholars, for
reasons I explore below.
The civil rights movement of the early sixties relied heavily on legal strate-
gies. Even though it employed civil disobedience as a tactic on many occa-
sions, an important purpose of such civil disobedience was to precipitate
court tests of legislation, official policy, or semi-official custom. The civil
rights movement aimed primarily, though not exclusively, at changing the
law-at establishing or protecting civil rights. The civil rights movement was
not concerned only with legal status; it also protested against poverty and
49. Compare Freeman, supra note 19 (analyzing limits of civil litigation as tool for promoting
social justice) and Freeman, Book Review, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981) (reviewing D. BELL, RACE,
RACISIM AND AMERICAN LAW (1980)) (noting failure of civil rights law in achieving substantive
results) with Unger, supra note 6 (celebrating the potential for advancing social change of doctrinal
argument that extends the premises of liberalism to their limits). The ambiguity of critical dis-
course on this issue is illustrated by Duncan Kennedy's claim that "it looks like it's trench warfare
for decades." Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1984). Does this
mean civil struggle ("in the trenches" of bureaucratic institutions) for decades, or confrontation and
violence ("warfare") for decades?
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hunger.50 Nevertheless, its most dramatic moments highlighted struggle over
rights rather than resources.5 1
In thus characterizing the civil rights movement I recognize that rights
and resources are not logically distinguishable-that is, resources can be dis-
tributed or protected by regimes of rights. The distinction I am making-
and that the civil right movement made-was one of tone, of rhetoric, of
symbolism. The civil rights movement, in the main, clothed the struggle
over economic resources in judicial garb.
There was an excellent tactical reason for doing so. The leaders of the civil
rights movement were convinced, as were many people in American society,
that blacks could never achieve material or political advancement in Ameri-
can society without the support of whites, particularly elite whites.52 They
calculated that legal imagery and rhetoric would appeal more to wealthy and
powerful whites than a simple demand for redistribution of wealth and
power from whites to blacks.
And they were right. The civil rights movement succeeded in capturing
the imagination of elite whites for two reasons: First, it relied on an image of
consensus; second, it portrayed that consensus in a way flattering to elite
whites.
By characterizing the struggle for black empowerment as a matter of equal
justice rather than particular interest, the civil rights movement called for
consensus rather than conflict. In the special circumstances of post-war
America, this was brilliant strategy. World War II had ended a decade of
intense social conflict by artificially imposing the unity required for national
mobilization. In the wake of the war, American public culture required the
continuation of that unity. As Gary Wills has argued, America had fallen in
love with "total war."' 53 The nation maintained the state of mobilization by
shifting its enmity from fascism to communism, but this was simply one as-
50. M.L. KING, WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 23-47 (1968) (pro-
cess of civil rights movement is power through self-respect); H. SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR
BLACK EQUALITY: 1954-1980, at 220 (1981) (detailing plans for 1968 march on Washington high-
lighting economic injustice).
51. See H. CRUSE, REBELLION OR REVOLUTION 156-167, 238-240 (1968) (discussing dispute
between W.E.B. DuBois and Booker T. Washington over whether black movement should aim
primarily at obtaining economic success or legal rights); F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS 207, 255-57 (1977) (questioning whether black advances in electoral and educational
rights can improve conditions of poor Southern blacks).
52. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 51, at 231-34 (channeling of civil rights movement by
Kennedy administration); A. WASKoW, FROM RACE-RIOT TO SIT-IN 261 (1966) (fear among some
blacks that race riots would threaten early achievements of civil rights movement).
53. G. WILLS, LEAD TIME 230-31 (1983); G. WILLS, THE KENNEDY IMPRISONMENT 276-77
(1982); G. WILLS, CONFESSION OF A CONSERVATIVE 208 (1979). For Wills' description of the rise
of the culture of conformity in America in the wake of World War II and the impact of that
"culture" on intellectual life in the universities, see Wills, Beyond Left and Right, in NIXON
AGONISTE 558-75 (1970).
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pect of an entire culture of conformity. The role of world leader, the rise of
broadcast communication, the popularization of psychology, all contributed
to an increased awareness of public image and an increasingly shared image
of the normal. In this cultural climate, it was not only possible but necessary
for black leaders to claim to represent a national consensus rather than a
particular interest group. In the wake of World War II, obedience to consen-
sus was a cultural imperative, and the rhetoric of equality in which black
leaders couched their demands neatly suited the conformist tenor of the
times.54 The civil rights movement accordingly was "civil" in two senses: it
addressed whites with polite respect, and it called upon whites to conform to
a new ethic of citizenship.
But the civil rights movement was not just "civil"; it was also a movement
for legal rights. By calling for a national consensus manifested through law,
the civil rights movement suggested that consensus appropriately ought to be
defined and administered by experts. This suggestion resonated with the au-
thoritarian and "scientistic" strands of post-war American culture, but it
held particular appeal for those members of elites who could envision them-
selves in the role of expert. The civil rights movement had tremendous ap-
peal for educated whites because it presented itself as a just struggle that
could never succeed without the talent, sophistication, and virtue (rather
than the money and influence) of white people. The civil rights movement
set out to flatter white people, and it succeeded.
For the generation of elite whites that produced critical legal studies, the
civil rights movement provided a compelling reason to go to law school. It
clothed the legal profession in glamor-a glamor that mysteriously survived
the anarchistic impulses of the late sixties and the materialistic impulses of
the late seventies. The source of that glamor was an image of lawyers as
intelligent and skilled authorities generating a consensus for social change.
This glamorous image was not confined to, or even principally associated
with, lawyers for the NAACP itself. Indeed, the measure of the NAACP's
success in identifying civil rights with a national consensus was the public
identification of civil rights with such leading lawyers for the state as Burke
Marshall, Nicholas Katzenbach, Archibald Cox, Ramsay Clark, and Bobby
Kennedy, and even with judges, such as Earl Warren and Frank Johnson.
Nor was the glamorous image of the lawyer as arbiter of social change neces-
sarily confined to the arena of civil rights: for years the most admired man in
54. See Dudziak, The Limits of Good Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas, 1950-1956, 5 LAW
AND HIST. REV. 351 (1987). For further reflections on the contributions of World War II to the
climate in which the civil rights movements emerged, see Kellogg, Civil Rights Consciousness in the
1940s, 42 HISTORIAN 18 (1979) (effect of World War II was to move focus of civil rights movement
from social and economic conditions of blacks to white racism).
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America was Ralph Nader. Despite its origins, this glamor seemed to sur-
vive even the withering away of the civil rights movement itself.
What it could not survive was the discrediting of the imagery of national
consensus on which the civil.'rights movement depended. During the 1960s,
that imagery was challenged or belied in a number of spheres of American
life. For the generation of American intellectuals that produced critical legal
studies, however, the context in which the myth of national consensus was
forever shattered was the Vietnam War.55 The experience of the Vietnam
years fundamentally altered their conceptions of the state, the national polit-
ical community, the role of the intellectual, and the process of social change.
Prior to the escalation of the Vietnam War, these young intellectuals had
viewed the state favorably. They looked upon the state as a force for social
change at home and abroad, and as a vehicle for their own influence, pres-
tige, and personal expression. In short, their attitude toward the state was
indistinguishable from the attitude of those older intellectuals who planned
the escalation of the Vietnam War. The difference was that the war
threatened the careers and lives of the younger intellectuals while advancing
the careers of the older intellectuals, an intergenerational conflict of interest
dramatized quite explicitly on dozens of college campuses. Not only did the
state make and enforce decisions contrary to the interests of these young
intellectuals, but it failed to respond to their objections, arguments, and pro-
tests. They began to perceive the state as corrupt, mechanistic, and imper-
sonal-"the system"-rather than benevolent, rational, and subservient-
"our system."
Prior to the escalation of the Vietnam War, young intellectuals identified
with other Americans, albeit condescendingly. They tended to think of all
Americans as members of a single political community, which they thought
of themselves as representing. Public response to the escalation of the Viet-
nam War undermined these attitudes. The American public became deeply
divided and demoralized. While most Americans eventually came to mis-
trust their government during this period, few showed much appreciation for
the protesting college students who initially brought the government's per-
fidy to their attention. Many Americans were equally hostile toward the
government and the protesters, a situation as surprising to the intellectuals
protesting the war as it was to the intellectuals planning it. Popular ambiva-
lence toward the antiwar movement convinced the student protesters that the
American people did not constitute a political community unified by public
rationality.
This absence of political community suggested to the protesters that they
55. White, supra note 12, at 668 (trust in authority of experts, forged in World War II, under-
mined by Vietnam War).
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would also have to adjust their conception of the political role of the intellec-
tual. Student activists could no longer conceive of themselves as authority
figures, representing and shaping a popular consensus. Instead, they were
forced to recognize that the intellectual was a marginal figure in American
political culture. They began to conceive of themselves as gadflies, challeng-
ing authority and provoking a public they had once hoped to lead.
As the relationships among the state, the public, and the intellectual
changed during the sixties, antiwar students abandoned the consensual
model of social change. Their own experience, more than any theory, con-
vinced them that social change could only be the product of conflict, con-
frontation, even violence. It was, after all, the immediate threat of being
drafted that had mobilized many of them into opposition to the war. At
campuses like Madison, Berkeley, and Columbia they discovered that con-
frontation-with its implicit threat of violence-could elicit a coercive re-
sponse from university or municipal authorities. The consequence, as
illustrated by the celebrated documentary, The War at Home, was to bring
the war home to students, their families and teachers, bystanders, and TV
audiences.5 6 As more and more people began to perceive themselves as po-
tential targets of state violence, trust in government decreased and opposition
to the war mounted. The process by which the antiwar movement grew dur-
ing those years provided student protesters-and broadcast audiences-with
an object lesson in Guevarist social theory.
Politicized blacks learned a similar lesson during the same period. The
failure of the civil rights movement to command a consensus among whites
became increasingly visible from several perspectives.
In the legal context, the great success of the fifties was the embarrassment
of the sixties. Despite an unbroken string of victories in the courts in school
desegregation cases, American schools remained segregated by the end of the
decade. 57 This partly reflected concerted resistance by whites in many com-
munities, but it also reflected a more diffuse form of resistance that pointed to
larger problems.
The biggest barrier facing school desegregation was the persistence and
proliferation of-residential segregation in urban areas.5 8 The 1960s witnessed
the first widespread recognition that geographically isolated black ghettos
represented an intractable problem. A decade earlier, still denominated
56. See generally The War at Home (Catalyst Films/Madison Production 1979); J. KUNEN, THE
STRAWBERRY STATEMENT (1969); H. DRAPER, BERKELEY: THE NEW STUDENT REVOLT (1965).
57. Baron & Hymer, The Negro Worker in the Chicago Labor Movement, in THE CAPITALIST
SYSTEM 304-05 (1972) (statistics show increasingly segregated school enrollment); S. WILHELM,
BLACK IN WHITE AMERICA 44-60 (1983) (study showing that blacks' principal social dealings are
with other blacks). See generally R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE GAP?
(1984)
58. R. FARLEY, supra note 57, at 32-35.
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slums, these neighborhoods had seemed to be more a matter of decaying
buildings than of decaying society. Planners confidently expected "slum
clearance" to do away with them.5 9 By the 1960s it was clear, however, that
ghettos were a social rather than an engineering problem. Middle class
whites were leaving city centers in droves, largely to get away from "crime,"
by which they meant blacks, particularly blacks in their children's schools. 60
The negative consequences of "white flight" went well beyond the resulting
resegregation of the schools. Whites took businesses and jobs with them, to
the suburbs, to the sunbelt. The economic boom of the 1960s only served to
dramatize the tremendous inequality of wealth between whites and blacks
that white flight protected.61
The interrelated phenomena of black "ghettoization" and white flight con-
vinced many blacks that the civil rights movement had been fundamentally
misguided in three respects: its commitment to consensus politics, its reli-
ance on legal strategies, and its nonviolent posture.
White flight demonstrated, of course, that the civil rights movement's ef-
fort to overcome white racial prejudice had not succeeded. In addition,
white flight suggested that the effort had been doomed from the outset. The
strategic basis for the effort was the belief that most whites identified strongly
with a national political community and felt constrained to conform to
whatever that community's authority figures identified as public rationality.
Civil rights leaders had hoped that if blacks were authoritatively defined into
the political community, they would be accepted by whites. The phenome-
non of White flight, however, showed that the commitment of most whites to
consensus was illusory. Richard Sennett has persuasively argued that this
phenomenon reflected the unwillingness of the postwar middle class to par-
ticipate in a public world characterized by any complexity, let alone racial
diversity.62 They responded to the intensified pressure to conform by reduc-
ing their exposure to public life. The flight to the suburbs revealed that pri-
vate rather than public rationality would shape the choices of whites. The
political community to whom the civil rights movement appealed simply did
not exist.
The economic stagnation that accompanied white flight suggested that the
emphasis of black leaders on legal rights had also been misguided. Blacks
had won a succession of rights against intentional discrimination in the
courts and Congress, but were not significantly better off in economic terms
59. See generally 0. NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE (1973); R. SENNErI, THE USES OF DISOR-
DER (1971).
60. See generally R. SENNETT, supra note 59.
61. Baron & Hymer, supra note 57, at 303-04 (discussing contributions of white flight and resi-
dential segregation to unemployment and undercompensation among urban blacks).
62. R. SENNETr, supra note 59.
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than they had been ten years before. 63 The emphasis on rights rather than
resources had been calculated to woo white opinion leaders. It was designed
to flatter them into promoting the interests of black people without overtly
challenging their wealth and power. By the late 1960s some blacks began to
feel that the strategy of exploiting white elites had backfired; white opinion
leaders had accepted black assurances that the civil rights movement was
harmless because those assurances were, in fact, true. When less patient
blacks pressed a more concrete agenda, they were often abandoned or even
corrected by their white allies.6 The civil rights movement had succeeded in
glamorizing its white sponsors but brought blacks little, not even a political
movement they could call their own.65
The phenomenon of white flight showed blacks that they could not expect
whites to share their advantages voluntarily. Appealing to the public con-
science of white Americans was hopeless if America lacked a public con-
science; appealing to authority was useless if it only aggrandized white
authority figures. Black communities began to suspect that the closing of a
segregated school might mean a loss of employment and authority for black
educators, with no compensatory improvement in the future opportunities of
black school children.66 From the middle 1960s, blacks resumed wondering,
as they had-many times before the 1950s, how they could empower them-
selves. 67 "The only way anybody eliminates poverty in this country," an-
nounced Stokely Carmichael, "is to give poor people money. You don't have
to headstart, uplift, and upward bound them into your culture. Just give us
the money you stole from us, that's all."'68
This concern precipitated the community control movement, a surge of
interest in Black Islam, and a new emphasis on economic independence. But
it also precipitated a reexamination of one of the civil rights movement's
most inspiring values: nonviolence. For in the bitter experience of white
63. And still are not. See generally R. FARLEY, supra note 57; S. WILHELM, supra note 57;
MINORITY REPORT (L. Dunbar ed. 1984).
64. See J. DREYFUSS & C. LAWRENCE, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 141-
61 (1979) (tracing uneasiness and subsequent withdrawal of white liberals from civil rights coalition
in response to black calls for political power and economic equality).
65. See Interview with Huey Newton, in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 495, 502-03 (1971) (Huey Newton decrying white control of Student Nonviolent Coordinat-
ing Committee (SNCC) as denying blacks their own political self-determination).
66. A. ADAIR, DESEGREGATION: THE ILLUSION OF BLACK PROGRESS 75 (1984); Mayer, The
Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The Teachers' Union and the Teacher
Strikes of 1968, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES, supra note 51, at 169 (struggle for representa-
tion on local school board between predominately black neighborhood residents and predominately
white teachers' union in New York City).
67. See generally H. CRUSE, BEHIND THE BLACK POWER SLOGAN: REBELLION OR REVOLU-
TION? 193-258 (1968) (offering perspectives on direction of black power movement; socialist or
capitalist, radical or accommodating).
68. G. OSOFSKY, THE BURDEN OF RACE 634 (1967) (quoting Chicago speech).
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flight there was one encouraging lesson-if whites had no affinity for blacks,
at least they were afraid of them.69 This meant that blacks, for all their
deprivation, had at least one political resource the civil rights movement had
deliberately overlooked. Experience taught ghetto dwelling blacks that the
most compelling arguments for nonviolence were prudential rather than ethi-
cal. Deprived blacks-like students threatened with conscription-had little
to lose by engaging in violence. "I find," Malcolm X reported, "that you can
get a whole lot of small people and whip hell out of a whole lot of big people.
They haven't got anything to lose and they've got everything to gain."'70
This was a lesson that the courageous young activists of the Student Non-
violent Coordinating Committee learned the hard way. Venturing into the
deep South to challenge segregation and disenfranchisement, they found
themselves the targets of persistent police and vigilante violence. Soon, pas-
sive resistance seemed no safer a strategy than self-defense. 7' This had been
intuited by urban blacks more often than it had been articulated; history
shows that this country's urban "race riots" typically have been precipitated
by police violence.72 Participation in the urban riots of the sixties was wide-
spread among young ghetto males, according to the Kerner Commission,
and was condoned by their elders. 73 The looting and burning that character-
ized these riots primarily targeted exploitative white owned businesses.74 It
was, in short, political protest.75
If ghetto dwellers felt they had little to lose from a strategy of violence,
black leaders discovered they had much to gain. James Button credits these
riots for the billions of dollars appropriated to the "War on Poverty" in the
late sixties and early seventies.76 Stephen Steinberg credits the riots with
inspiring affirmative action recruitment of blacks by edgy corporate employ-
69. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 153 (1978) (discussing discovery
by blacks that whites are afraid of blacks). For an ironic account of the consequences of this in-
sight, see T. WOLFE, RADICAL CHIC AND MAU-MAUING THE FLAK CATCHERS (1971).
70. G. OSOFSKY, supra note 68, at 602.
71. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 51, at 252-53 (wounding of James Meredith while
peacefully protesting leads some young civil rights leaders to denounce nonviolence); Roberts, The
Story of Snick. From Freedom High to Black Power, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES, supra note
66, at 139 (describing transformation of SNCC from cooperation and nonviolence to confrontation
and agitation).
72. See generally A. WASKOW, supra note 52, at 255-59 (1964 race riots in New York, Jersey
City, Rochester, and Paterson triggered by police brutality).
73. S. STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CLASS IN AMERICA 215 (1982)
(quoting Kerner Commission on Civil Disorder).
74. For material on the exploitative practices of ghetto businesses during this period, see Baron &
Hymer, supra note 57, at 294.
75. R. FOGELSON, VIOLENCE AS PROTEST 22 (1971) (riots an articulate protest against segrega-
tion and oppression); T. HAYDEN, REBELLION IN NEWARK (1967) (riots characterized as people
making history by taking charge of their own fates).
76. J. BUTTON, BLACK VIOLENCE 161-63 (1978).
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ers.77 These themes coalesced in the recruitment of blacks to staff the new,
publicly funded social welfare programs.78 Whatever the long-term effects,
violent protest produced concrete short-term benefits for blacks that nonvio-
lent protest had failed to produce. "As Button observed [in Black Violence],
the tendency among social scientists to be philosophically opposed to vio-
lence and to believe in the possibility of peaceful change has deterred them
from even asking whether violence in specific situations might function as an
instrument of social change."'79 The predicament of black Americans in the
1960s forced them to confront this question. Their resulting experience con-
vinced some of them that the answer to this question was "yes." Some may
find this answer cynical, but for those who risked their lives and liberty to
stand up for what we all know is right, this answer was the expression of a
courage and commitment that too few have.
These then, were the experiences that shaped the Critics' understanding of
social change. Not all of them experienced these events directly. Many of
those who most feared and resisted the draft were not active in the earlier
civil rights movement-and vice versa. Sadly, almost no critical legal schol-
ars were in a position to be anything more than sympathetic observers of the
black power movement. Many of the more recent adherents of critical legal
studies were too young to take a very active role in any of these movements,
although an increasing number have contributed insights earned on the front
lines of the more recent women's movement.
The backgrounds of critical legal scholars vary-more by age than by race,
sex, or class. Nevertheless, I would insist that the experiential base of critical
legal studies lies in the social movements of the sixties, regardless of the par-
ticular experience of any given critical legal scholar. The aspects of this
drama not experienced directly were experienced vicariously and imagina-
tively understood. Whether born in the baby boom or before, the critical
legal scholars mostly followed the same political odyssey at roughly the same
time. In 1964, whether third-graders or "3Ls," critical legal scholars ex-
pected to go at least part of the way with LBJ. By the time of the Tet offen-
sive, they were likely to have become deeply cynical about government but
utopian about society. They saw a connection between the student move-
ment-whether they were students or not-and the release of their own ca-
pacities for self-expression. By the time Nixon resigned, however, they were
profoundly alienated from American society as well as from its government.
Some moved further to the left in response to this alienation; others became
alienated as they saw their compatriots sliding to the right. All now recog-
77. S. STEINBERG, supra note 73, at 216.
78. F. PIVEN & P. CLOWARD, supra note 51, at 254-55.
79. S. STEINBERG, supra note 73, at 218 (citing J. BUTTON, supra note 76).
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nized that they were on the extreme "leftward fringe," not only of the legal
academy but of American life.
For one small but significant group within critical legal studies, such alien-
ation was a fact of life that preceded the social movements of the sixties. For
the children of the old left, raised amidst the great terrors and small indigni-
ties of McCarthyism, the state had never been a friend and American society
would never seem secure. Though few in number, such "red diaper babies"
were an important element in the formation of critical legal studies because
they brought to the group a fluency in Marxist discourse that many of its
members lacked. For them, "Mensheviks," "crisis," and "praxis" were as
familiar as "schmendricks," "tzouris" and "taxes," and "materialism" had
always meant more than a Bloomingdale's charge card. Their deeply rooted
suspicion of idealism kept critical legal studies from getting lost in its own
fog and helped link critical legal studies to an earlier radical tradition.
Despite its long pedigree, the radicalism of the red diaper babies turned
out to be surprisingly similar in sensibility to that of their peers. For both
groups, the student movement was in part an intergenerational struggle-in
some cases against old left parents, in other cases against New Frontier 8°
teachers. In embracing the left, of course, the old left's young identified with
their elders; however, in attacking the state-the very state that had perse-
cuted their parents-they also scorned their parents' faith. To reject the
state as a vehicle for progressive social change was to reject the "democratic
centralism" of Stalin as well as the welfare state of Roosevelt. After all, there
was a time when these two leaders were allies, and communist parties
throughout the world, under the guidance of Stalin, hailed Roosevelt's poli-
cies as steps toward world socialism.81 Young liberals could hardly have felt
a greater sense of betrayal on being drafted to die in Vietnam than old leftists
did on being blacklisted. The suspicion of institutions that marked the new
left was born of both epiphanies. Individual experience may determine when
each of us will find the courage to march; but the culture will plot our direc-
tion for as long as the government builds the roads. A few members of criti-
cal legal studies may have encountered the totalitarian implications of cold
war liberalism earlier than others, but they all trod the same rocky path.
Somewhere along this path, each of them stumbled over a legal education.
Most began life relatively well off, if not actually destined for membership in
80. "The New Frontier," history's designation for Kennedy's program, was more image than
substance from its inception. Kennedy introduced it to the nation in his acceptance speech at the
1960 convention, proclaiming, "The New Frontier is not a set of promises, it is a set of challenges."
The phrase evoked and evokes cold war liberalism at its most optimistic and imperialistic. The best
portrait of the era is still D. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972).
81. See F. SCHURMANN, THE LOGIC OF WORLD POWER 72-74 (1974) (international left's opti-
mistic impression of U.S. during and after World War II); id. at 16, 68 (Stalin disbands Comintern
and U.S. Communist party after alliance with Roosevelt).
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the ruling elites. They were ambitious and sometimes self-important. Their
commitment to social change had been inspired initially by sympathetic ob-
servation of, and identification with, the struggles of black people for equal
justice. Their own experience in social activism was most likely to have come
in preventing themselves or their friends from being drafted. This experience
convinced them that the consensus politics of the civil rights movement
rested on illusion-that social change required confrontation, risk, even vio-
lence. When, as law students, lawyers, or legal scholars, their attention re-
turned to the problems of black people, they found their own experience
confirmed-confrontation and violence had been more effective than civility
and conciliation. They were taught in law school to think of social conflict as
an engineering problem for legal experts-but their own experience and ob-
servation of social conflict taught them it was not resolvable by "neutral
principles," "reasoned elaboration," or the "balancing" of "legitimate
interests."
Critical legal studies was born of this dissonance between the student polit-
ical experience of the sixties and the law school curriculum of the sixties and
seventies. This dissonance was differently experienced in the lives of different
incipient critics.
Some were student activists in the sixties and attended law school after the
antiwar movement had run its course. For them, law school was a cultural
anachronism, a strange Sunday school in which the discredited values of au-
thority and consensus were piously intoned and acted out by people smart
enough to know better. 82
Some of those who later swelled the ranks of critical legal studies were too
young for the draft. Graduating from college in the middle to late seventies,
they went to law school out of a sense of despair and frustration: political
activism was dead, academic careers were foreclosed, careers in the arts were
too risky in a time of recession. The future they had looked forward to as
sophisticated children of the sixties was gone before they ever got to it. What
you can't beat you might as well join, but no one said you had to enjoy it.
They hated law school before they attended a single class.
But the founders of critical legal studies for the most part graduated from
college before the antiwar movement gained momentum. In many cases
82. Philip Johnson offers the following unenthusiastic defense of liberal neutrality as a guiding
principle for legal scholarship:
Possibly bringing the value conflicts into the open, and acknowledging that we do not
know how to solve them, would have disastrous consequences. Fear of such consequences
might reasonably lead some who think they see through the false pretenses of liberal ra-
tionalism to pretend to believe in it anyway, in the manner of agnostics who send their
children to Sunday School.
Johnson, supra note 12, at 279.
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these founders made the decision to attend law school before disillusionment
with the state became widespread. Then, while they were in law school, all
hell broke loose. For them, I suspect, professional education and political
experience were most acutely dissonant because while their teachers interest-
balanced the forum-Washington Square, Harvard Square, Sproul Plaza,
and especially the New Haven Green-burned. These young law students
had already committed themselves to careers as professional bureaucrats at a
time when careers were suddenly irrelevant and bureaucracy illegitimate. If
some of them were already too old to feel personally threatened by the draft,
they nevertheless shared the undergraduates' profound sense of alienation
from their teachers. The staid, professional education the law students were
receiving was not only at odds with the party going on elsewhere on campus,
but it prevented them from joining it. Going to law school in the late sixties
was like having to go to summer school while your friends were all out play-
ing ball.
We can better understand the empirical base and practical import of the
critical legal studies critique of legal doctrine if we dramatize it as an in-
tergenerational struggle. The incipient Critics had a very different experience
with American political life than did their teachers and senior colleagues;
therefore, they rejected their elders' assumptions about American political
culture and the American political process.
What were the seminal political experiences of the older generation, the
experiences that shaped the law school curriculum and legal scholars of the
sixties and seventies?
The central event, experienced directly by some of the most senior scholars
and vicariously by the rest, was the New Deal and its attendant struggle
between Court and Congress. This struggle was understood at the time, and
has been understood by most legal scholars ever since, as a struggle between
the political process and the market. The market was egotistic, competitive,
and coercive. Because it concentrated decisionmaking power in the hands of
a few, it was antidemocratic and unfair. The political process, by contrast,
was majoritarian, democratic, and fair. It diffused decisionmaking among
large numbers of people. The typical product of the political process was
legislation enabling the majority to regulate the market. Judicial review of
legislation was understood to involve protection of the market from political
regulation. Judges that engaged in judicial review claimed that their deci-
sions were fair or "neutral," because they were derived from principle rather
than political expediency. Legal scholars countered that those principles fa-
vored the market, which was inherently unfair. Because judicial review was
identified with protection of the market, it was seen as illegitimate. The op-
position between markets and political processes, basic to post-war political
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science,83 was expressed in the law schools as an opposition between judicial
review and legislation.84
A second formative experience was World War II and its aftermath. I
have already discussed a major effect of this experience on American intellec-
tual life: the rise of a culture that especially valued national conformity and
scientific authority. This cultural climate made possible a partial rehabilita-
tion of legal reasoning and adjudication in the law schools. For the legal
scholars of the New Frontier, the opposition between politics and law that
had emerged in the New Deal era could be mediated by political culture.
Legal scholars shared with the political scientists of this period8 5 a new un-
derstanding of the political process. The political process represented not so
much the will of an aggregation of particular people, but an authoritatively
defined national political culture,86 a national mission. That culture stressed
unity, equality, fairness, and rationality. The function of the political process
was therefore rational and fair decisionmaking, rather than simply a fair ag-
gregation of subjective preference.
Once this conception of the political process was accepted, judicial review
could be reconciled with the political process. Legal scholars began to iden-
tify adjudication with the "process values" stressed by the political culture.
By identifying Nazi genocide with irrational arbitrariness (rather than, say,
scientific rationality), post-war legal scholars implied that the War was
fought and won in defense of the rule of law. 87 Because judicial decisions
now represented the conformist political culture rather than the controver-
sial ethic of the marketplace, they were appropriately "neutral." Application
of this standard of neutrality did not require that values advanced by judges
be "objective" or "true," provided that those values were supported by a
social consensus. Since the conformist culture led people to assume that the
values of most people were (or should be) shared by all, neutral decisionmak-
ing involved the identification and implementation of the values of normal
people. Typically, this was expressed in terms of the identification and bal-
ancing of "legitimate interests." 88 From the perspective of New Frontier
legal scholars, it made little difference whether judges could perform this task
83. See generally C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1978).
84. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1978); J.
CHOPER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1979).
85. See generally A. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE (1963).
86. See generally id. (demographic surveys of United States, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy,
and Mexico analyzing political participation).
87. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958).
88. Including the "interests" of the political process itself. See Katz, Studies hi Boundary The-
ory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383, 434 (1979) (concept of
"interest" used in legal reasoning to mediate irreconcilable categories); see also A. KATZ, "BAL-
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with precision, so long as they did so with properly humble sincerity. Adju-
dication was simply one part of a complex "process" of information gather-
ing. The ultimate outcomes would be shaped by a culturally determined
political consensus.
Much of the curriculum designed by the New Frontier or "legal process"
scholars could be characterized as the ritual humiliation and rehabilitation of
judicial review and of legal reasoning generally. Yes, judicial review was
countermajoritarian and had been abused; however, courts were especially
competent to ensure the "rationality" of the political process. One of the
principal occasions for the celebration of judicial review in the legal process
curriculum was the teaching of civil rights decisions in constitutional law.
This was where the generations joined battle. In the eyes of the legal pro-
cess scholars, the civil rights movement represented a triumph of public ra-
tionality and a moral vindication of their chosen careers. In the eyes of the
young Critics, the civil rights movement was a disappointing failure that had
been premised on a conception of American. politics they abandoned as na-
ive. For this reason, the entire drama of the legal process curriculum, with
its veneration of the political process and its mortification and ultimate vindi-
cation of judicial review, had a very different meaning for the Critics than the
one intended by their teachers. After witnessing the duplicity of numerous
authority figures during the Vietnam years, the Critics simply could not be-
lieve that their teachers were expending all this energy to convince them that
the little bit the courts had done for black people was justifiable. They sus-
pected that the whole effort was an elaborate charade designed to persuade
them and the imaginary black clients they had brought with them to law
school, to forego violent confrontation in favor of a futile strategy of litiga-
tion and conciliation.
To the Critics, the ritual veneration of the political process was a cruel
joke. In their experience, the distinction between politics and markets, inher-
ited by their teachers from the New Deal, was meaningless. To them, Amer-
ican politics was a vicious struggle of contending interests in which outcomes
were determined by power and wealth rather than by majority will. To the
extent that less privileged people acquiesced in these outcomes, their consent
was purchased or coerced. In short, the political process could not restrain
or regulate the market-it was the market. This meant that impoverished,
disempowered blacks could never hope to increase their wealth or power
through the political process, because the results of the political process were
determined by the distribution of wealth and power.89 To the Critics this
ANCING" IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 18 (1987) ("balancing" of "interests" amounts to discipline
involving the social construction of normality and deviance).
89. For an exploration of these issues from a variety of perspectives, see Bell, The 1983 McCor-
mick Mitchell Lecture-A Hurdle Too High: Class-Based Roadblocks to Racial Remediation, 33
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was axiomatic. New Deal Democrats might lament it; neoconservatives had
emerged to celebrate it; but after the election and reelection of Richard
Nixon, everyone knew it: the market and the political process were both part
of the same corrupt system.90
Accordingly, the Critics assumed that the next act in the drama, the morti-
fication of judicial review, was meant to be ironic. Surely the elaborate apol-
ogies for the "countermajoritarian" character of judicial review were not
meant to be taken seriously. The Critics suspected that legal scholars who
lamented the "fact" that adjudication wasn't more like the political process
were really fishing for compliments: the courts, they were implying, weren't
part of "the system."
This suspicion was confirmed by the final act in the drama, the vindication
of judicial review. At this stage of the drama, it became clear that the players
didn't really think adjudication was so bad. In fact, they implied that it was
better than the political process-or at least better than the Critics' image of
the political process. They claimed that adjudication provided the under-
privileged with a neutral forum, isolated from the pressures of the market-
place, in which their interests would count as much as anyone else's. To the
Critics, this implied that black people didn't need wealth and power in order
to have their interests looked after. The legal doctrine and constitutional
theory taught in law school thus seemed to legitimize an unfair distribution
of wealth and power.
Moreover, the Critics' own observations of American society belied the
claims made by the law school curriculum. Blacks had not realized their
aspirations through the legal system, because those aspirations included the
acquisition of wealth and power. The courts could not redistribute wealth
and power because that was a political function, one that was inappropriate
for a nonrepresentative institution. The Critics began to suspect that this
was what their teachers really meant when they said that the courts were
different from the marketplace. Their teachers were really saying that the
courts were insulated from wealth and power in order to justify the courts'
failure to redistribute wealth and power. Once again, the legal process schol-
ars seemed to argue that any distribution of wealth and power generated by
the market and the political process was legitimate. The interest of blacks in
redistribution of wealth and power was not a "legitimate interest." Insofar
as law professors admitted that blacks would not achieve redistribution of
wealth and power through the courts, their claim that blacks could protect
BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1984) (symposium with opening lecture delivered by Prof. Derrick Bell and
replies by Profs. Monroe Fordham, Alan Freeman, and Sidney Wilhelm followed by questions from
audience).
90. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory- And its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 242-44
(1981) (discussing relation between economic status and political participation in U.S.).
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their interests through the courts was revealed to be ideology-that is, false.
The apparent truth of the claim depended upon the power of the courts to
define which interests counted as "legitimate."
That courts were no more effective than the political process as vehicles for
the social advancement of the underprivileged suggested to the Critics that
the courts were no fairer than the political process. Their teachers defended
the decisions of the courts on the grounds that they accurately reflected con-
sensus values. To the Critics, this response sounded disingenuous. Their
own political experience had convinced them that American political culture
was characterized by conflict rather than consensus. Moreover, they were
fairly confident that by the 1970s, this perception of American political cul-
ture was fairly widespread. Accordingly, they were convinced that the val-
ues employed by the courts to decide cases could not command the support
of the entire society. How, the Critics wondered, could the courts and their
defenders justify the claim that the principles by which they decided cases
represented a consensus that did not, in reality, exist?91
The answer that the Critics discovered was that the courts consistently
invoked contradictory principles, each of which embodied the interests of
opposing groups. Thus the courts could uphold economic regulation on the
ground that an unregulated market was unfair;92 strike down racially dis-
criminatory legislation on the ground that the political process was unfair;93
but uphold legislation that discriminated on the basis of wealth on the
ground that the results of a politically regulated market were fair.94 By pick-
ing and choosing from among opposing principles, the courts could reach
opposing results on any controversial issue. Because legal doctrine provides
courts with opposing principles, the Critics concluded, legal doctrine is inde-
terminate. But because courts invoke these opposing principles, they appear
to have taken all viewpoints into account. Thus indeterminacy serves an ide-
91. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983) (comparison of interpretivism and neutral principles with
political philosophy of liberalism, arguing that development of consensus of meaning would destroy
liberal individualism).
92. E.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (state statute fixing minimum wage
for women upheld).
93. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (local racial housing ordinance denied equal protec-
tion); see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail those
political processes ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities").
94. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state regulation excluding use of Medicaid benefits for
nontherapeutic abortions upheld); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (rezoning decision with socially disproportionate impact upheld in absence of proof of
discriminatory motive); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(state school financing system with adverse impact on poor upheld).
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ological function, creating the illusion that judicial decision reflects a political
consensus.
The claim that judicial decisions are authorized by a political consensus
serves a further ideological function. It reinforces the illusion that such a
consensus exists. And this last illusion fulfills an important legitimation
function: if the actors in American politics are directed by shared values
rather than opposing interests, then it is conceivable that the political process
will transfer wealth and power from those with more to those with less. If
the political process will lead to the empowerment of the weak and the en-
richment of the poor, then the poor and weak have no need to use or threaten
violence in order to achieve justice.
Now, it may appear that I am saying that arcane legal doctrine persuades
poor, oppressed people to accept their situations. But I am saying no such
thing. I agree with the left skeptics that such people do not read court opin-
ions or legal treatises. Legal doctrine is produced for consumption primarily
by the powerful rather than the powerless. Moreover, I agree that oppressed
people aren't induced to accept their situations by legal doctrine, although
there is evidence that poor people are influenced by popular versions of a
similar ideology.95 Primarily, oppressed people are induced to accept their
situations by coercion or the fear of it. Coercion is applied by powerful peo-
ple. Some powerful people apply it because they perceive that to be in their
interest. Some powerful people apply coercion because they think it is mor-
ally justified-probably for many powerful people, the two criteria are insep-
arable. Legal ideology does not legitimate inequality for its victims-it
legitimates inequality for its beneficiaries. It helps its beneficiaries believe
their society meets the needs of the powerless. Accordingly, it also helps
them believe that the powerless are not justified in using or threatening vio-
lence to seize some of the power. This provides-for those powerful people
that need it-a justification for vigorously repressing confrontational behav-
ior on the part of people without power. They can tell themselves that the
application of such coercion in no way impedes powerless people from realiz-
ing their aspirations.
Let me offer an example of this sort of legitimation from the related con-
text of academic sociology. Just as powerful people are the primary consum-
ers of legal thought, they are the primary consumers of social science
research. Since the late 1960s, neoconservative sociologists have been argu-
ing, with increasing crudeness, that the differential social mobility of ethnic
95. See generally M. BURAWY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: CHANGES IN THE LABOR PROCESS
UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM 109-20 (1979); 0. LEWIS, supra note 22; E. LIEBOW, supra note
22; L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 336-449 (1979);
R. SENNETT & J. COBB, supra note 22; W. SEWALL, WORLD AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE
LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE OLD REGIME TO 1848 (1980).
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groups in America has been determined by differences among the cultures of
those groups. Thus ethnic groups that became economically and politically
assimilated were able to do so because of their middle class values. Black
people, however, failed to do so, because of a lack of "achievement-orienta-
tion" rather than because of racial discrimination or economic
disadvantage. 96
Now the first thing I would like you to notice about this argument is its
similarity to the ideology embodied in legal doctrine: it vindicates an institu-
tion-in this case the market-by invoking a cultural consensus-in this case
middle class values. It presents this cultural consensus as a potential avenue
for black advancement, while lamenting black deviance from that consensus.
The second thing I would like you to notice about this argument is that it
implies that the failure of blacks to achieve material and political equality in
American society is their own fault.97 Now this ideological claim can be
used in a number of ways. Directed at blacks themselves, it can be used to
convince them to accept their situations, and I suspect that it is being used in
this way today. But the initial audience for this ideology consisted of power-
ful whites who could be persuaded that blacks needed no affirmative eco-
nomic assistance. Thus persuaded, powerful whites became increasingly
confident that confrontational demands for redistribution of wealth and
power were illegitimate, and that intransigent and even violent responses to
such demands.were legitimate. And lo and behold, blacks, despite their con-
tinuing deprivation, have ceased framing such demands. I don't think this is
because they are convinced that this deprivation is their own fault-I think it
may be because they know that powerful whites believe that their condition
is their own fault. People will risk violence when they believe they have little
to lose by it, so long as they think they have something to gain by it. The
current ideological climate among the ruling class has convinced blacks that
confrontation will be not only dangerous (it always is), but fruitless as well.
Here then is the Critics' beef against the ideology embodied in legal doc-
trine and legal scholarship: it encourages those in power to punish violently
the one strategy that offers oppressed people any realistic hope of improving
their lot. This conclusion is not based on social scientific research, but it is
rooted in experience. The belief that confrontation with its attendant risk of
violence is the only realistic strategy for achieving social change in contem-
porary America is a product of the Critics' own experience and observation
96. See generally E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY REVISITED (1974); N. GLAZER & P.
MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1970); T. SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS (1976); Es-
SAYS AND DATA ON AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS (T. Sowell ed. 1978); Glazer, Slums and Ethnic-
ity, in SOCIAL WELFARE AND URBAN PROBLEMS 84 (T. Sherrard ed. 1968).
97. See W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971) (theories and programs designed to eradicate
poverty, poor education, or racial injustice by reforming character or culture of victims actually
stigmatize and dominate them).
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of American politics. The belief that legal doctrine and legal thought are
used to persuade American leaders otherwise is a product of the Critics' own
encounters with their teachers and senior colleagues in elite American law
schools. The question raised by the skeptics, which the Critics must address,
is what the Critics hope to accomplish by exposing and attacking that
ideology.
Any candid answer to this question must begin with the admission that the
aims of critical legal studies are modest. The Critics do not hope to redistrib-
ute power and wealth in American society through changes in the courts or
in legislation. Their own understanding of American politics convinces them
that courts and legislatures will not redistribute wealth and power without
the consent of the holders of wealth and power. Nor do they expect, by
themselves, to persuade the holders of wealth and power to relinquish them.
The Critics' theory of social change convinces them that legal or policy argu-
ments are not likely to be effective in achieving social change, and that is why
critical legal scholars have produced few novel legal theories or legislative
reform proposals. In their eyes, litigation and lobbying cannot produce so-
cial change. Only confrontation can.
Poverty lawyers have sometimes complained that critical legal scholars
disdain the representation of poor people and demean the already underap-
preciated poverty lawyer as a dupe of the ruling class. I think this complaint
reflects a misunderstanding of the behavior of critical legal scholars. The
Critics are interested in facilitating social change. In their eyes, the represen-
tation of poor people is a worthy task because it enables poor people to hold
on to the limited resources they already have. But it is unlikely to result in
redistribution of resources, and that is why most Critics don't do it. There
are two settings in which, under the assumptions made by critical legal schol-
ars, the legal representation of poor people could contribute to social change.
One setting is the representation of groups. Here lawyers can sometimes
function as organizers, encouraging poor people to confront adversaries di-
rectly rather than merely through the courts. Some critical legal scholars
have engaged in and have written about this kind of legal practice. 98 A sec-
ond setting is the criminal defense of those poor people who are prosecuted
for civil and uncivil disobedience. 99 This type of practice can help sustain
and protect a movement for social change once it is underway-but it can
rarely instigate one.
98. E.g., Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83); Simon, Visions of Practice in
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 483 (1984) (quoting Bellow, Turning Solutions into
Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 119 (1977)).
99. Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 21, at
310.
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How then, do critical legal scholars hope to instigate social change? If
they believe that social change can only come through confrontation and the
threat of violence, and yet they wish to instigate social change, one might
suppose that they intend to engage in confrontation and violence. Yet they
have not done so and will not do so. The reason they will not do so is very
simple-they're scared. This is also the reason that most people don't engage
in confrontation politics. Even the most destitute, desperate people seldom
engage in confrontation politics, because it is extremely dangerous. But criti-
cal legal scholars are neither destitute nor desperate. They are privileged,
comfortable, sometimes even well off and influential people. They have little
to gain from the confrontation politics and much to lose. Critical legal stud-
ies simply is not a movement of oppressed people, because its members are
not sufficiently oppressed-and most of them prefer it that way.
This claim requires some clarification in light of the insistence on the part
of some leading critical legal scholars that they are oppressed. Drawing on
the intellectual tradition of existential Marxism, 100 Duncan Kennedy and Pe-
ter Gabel have stressed the feelings of alienation, loneliness, and fear that
afflict even privileged people in "bourgeois society."101 They have also ar-
ticulated the frustrating impotence experienced by people whose privileged
leadership roles ironically prescribe their every move. 102 These complaints
echo the sense of self-estrangement expressed by elite students during the
Vietnam years. This sense of estrangement was not confined to the rice pad-
dies of selective service 10 3 but flowed across what critical legal scholar Karl
Klare is wont to call "the entire existential space of everyday life," 104 a pur-
gatory protested by Peter Gabel's Harvard classmates in the following terms:
Strike for the eight demands. Strike because you hate cops. Strike because
your roommate was clubbed. Strike to stop expansion. Strike to seize con-
trol of your life. Strike to become more human. Strike to return Paine
Hall scholarships. Strike because there's no poetry in your lectures. Strike
because classes are a bore. Strike for power. Strike to smash the Corpora-
100. See generally M. POSTER, EXISTENTIAL MARXISM IN POSTWAR FRANCE (1975).
101. Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,
62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1567-76 (1984); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 211-13 (1979).
102. E.g., D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983).
103. Alan Freeman escaped the draft by working in the Air Force bureaucracy after law school,
a job he describes as "the ultimate radicalizing experience." Unmediated personal chat with Alan
Freeman, Professor, S.U.N.Y./Buffalo Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence (March 1986). For a
description of Prof. Freeman's role in the origins of critical legal studies, see Schlegel, supra note 13,
at 391.
104. Klare, Two Dialogues on Critical Legal Theory and its Implications for Reconstruction
(discussion with Ed Sparer, followed by discussion between Gerald Frug, Alan Hutchinson, and
Patrick Monahan) (Seventh National Conference on Critical Legal Studies, Camden, N.J., Apr. 17,
1983).
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tion. Strike to make yourself free. Strike to abolish ROTC. Strike because
they are trying to squeeze the life out of you. Strike. 10
5
Young Harvard grads like Duncan Kennedy or Mark Tushnet, moving to
New Haven for law school in the late sixties, might have wondered whether
they had a chance of living authentically as lawyers. 10 6 If they asked one of
their teachers named Charles Reich, he might have told them that young
professionals "are role-players. They have an image of what is fitting to their
roles. And in choosing the activities and interests that make up their life,
they are choosing from sources outside themselves .... Their choices need
not come out of a popular magazine. They can come out of a sense that a
young lawyer has a) political interests, b) cultural interests, c) likes sports, d)
does things that are offbeat and in good taste .... All of [their]... activities
have the quality of separateness from self, of fitting some pattern-a pattern
already known and only waiting to be fulfilled." 10 7 The privileged life of the
professional did not seem to offer the kind of freedom for which the Harvard
student struck.
Now, I don't deny that well paid lawyers can be desperately unhappy in
corporate-bureaucratic jobs; 10 8 I don't deny that legal scholars can feel im-
prisoned by the very authority society accords them, and I don't deny that
these sorts of suffering resemble the feelings of oppression expressed by priv-
ileged students in the Vietnam years. What I do deny is that the oppression
experienced by most lawyers and legal scholars is sufficiently severe to induce
the sufferers to risk life and limb-or even to give up the roles that cause
such suffering. The deprivation Reich describes-an inability to express the
authentic self-is experienced as an individual one. It is not the sort of com-
plaint people have traditionally organized to fight against. What distin-
guished the students of the Vietnam era was that enough of them were
sufficiently frightened by their circumstances to undertake the risks of con-
frontation. The resulting repression generated a movement that provided
students with opportunities for community and commitment. They didn't
necessarily set out to overcome their feelings of alienation, 10 9 but in the
course of resisting the draft, students discovered that they could experience
105. Strike Manifesto, LIFE, Apr. 25, 1969, at 35.
106. I make no claim about what any of these scholars actually felt-my goal is to describe the
social milieu in which critical legal studies was born and the sentiments that milieu probably in-
duced in many of its inhabitants. Whether or not these two perceptive scholars shared those feel-
ings, I am confident that they were aware that others felt them. This paragraph is not based on
experience reported to me by either of the individuals named.
107. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 81-82 (1971).
108. Brill & Bruck, Whatever Happened to the Yale Class of 1959?, AM. LAW., Oct. 1981, at 21
(inteview with 30 members of Yale class of 1959).
109. The Berkeley free speech movement could be interpreted as a quest for self-expression
rather than a social protest movement, but is more properly understood as an outgrowth of the civil
rights movement. See H. DRAPER, supra, note 56, at 1-15.
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fulfillment in a community that they could not experience individually. Crit-
ical legal scholars are nostalgic for such a communal life,110 but are not, at
present, willing to risk much for it. As a result they are very cautious. Not
only do they refrain from engaging in confrontation, violence, or even civil
disobedience, they also generally refrain from advocating such behavior.
That, I believe, is the principle reason why some observers have been led to
believe that critical legal scholars have no theory of social change. But it's
not that they have none-it's just that they're skittish about articulating it.
I suspect that part of the reason for this caution is that legal scholars are
in a position to alleviate some of the most uncomfortable aspects of their
oppression at relatively little cost. Academic jobs enable them to escape the
most military rigors of bureaucratic employment. They have-slowly and
cautiously at first-carved out opportunities for self-expression in their re-
search. There is poetry in their lectures. They have struggled, in their rela-
tions with colleagues, students, and secretaries, to avoid the illegitimate use
of authority.
All of this has helped critical legal scholars feel less oppressed-but it has
not entailed substantial risk, commitment, or even collective activity. It rep-
resents a private solution both in the sense that it doesn't require anybody's
help and in the sense that it is unavailable to most people in our society.
Whatever contribution to social change critical legal scholars are making,
they will not make that contribution by pursuing their own liberation.
Although critical legal scholars may be oppressed, critical legal studies is not
an oppressed people's movement. The old-fashioned way to express this
would have been to say that critical legal scholars lack consciousness of
themselves as an oppressed class.
That critical legal studies is not an oppressed people's movement is the
reason that I see it as quite distinct from feminism. It is also the reason I
believe that feminism played a minor role in the initial development of criti-
cal legal studies. The other movements I discussed-the civil rights move-
ment, the black power movement, the antiwar movement-were precursors
to critical legal studies. Feminism is more of a contemporary. Radical wo-
men who were active in-and frustrated by-these other movements in the
sixties applied these experiences in the seventies to a movement aimed at
overcoming their own oppression."' They developed a somewhat different
theory of social change, in which violence was often eschewed as a sympton
of testosterone poisoning, and emphasis was placed on changing
consciousness. 112
110. Note the wistful tone in Schlegel, supra note 13.
111. See M. WALLACE, BLACK MACHO AND THE MYTH OF THE SUPERWOMAN (1978).
112. For discussion of consciousness raising as a technique for personal transformation and so-
cial change, see J. MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE 62 (1973); R. MORGAN, SISTERHOOD IS POWER-
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Now despite this primary emphasis on combatting ideology, the practice
of consciousness raising required considerably more courage then the prac-
tice of critical legal studies and was more directly related to social change.
Consciousness raising could be credibly presented as a method of social
change on the assumption that large numbers of women lived in isolation
from one another, threatened with domestic violence at home and sexual
harassment abroad. For such women, consciousness raising-escaping isola-
tion, assembling together, articulating anger, and finally asserting one's
self-would in and of itself involve a dramatic change in social circumstance.
It could also lead to confrontation with men and the risk of repressive vio-
lence. Partisans of guerrilla warfare assume that violent confrontation can
solidify and empower a community because they envision these events taking
place in a public arena; but the structure of society dictates that violent con-
frontation between men and women will most often occur in private, where
women may be deprived of community. For feminists, violent confrontation
accordingly is the painful cost of social change, not its catalyst.
Yet neither is discussion-as it may be for middle class male academics-a
"safe" alternative to social change. To the contrary, for women who are
abused and overburdened homemakers, assembly for political discussion and
self-expression represents a change in social position purchased at great risk.
By contrast, for a group of law professors to assemble for political discussion
requires little risk and less social change. The feminist movement can some-
times change society in the very act of discussing ideology to the extent that
the movement is composed of people suffering from coerced silence and isola-
tion. Critical legal scholars are not in the same social position, and their
conversations, regardless of content, cannot make the same contribution to
social change.
So: critical legal scholars don't litigate or legislate, because that won't pro-
duce social change. They don't engage in violent confrontation, because
that's not worth the risk to them. They don't even incite others to violent
confrontation, because that's also dangerous. So what do they do? How
does critical legal studies contribute to social change?
What critical legal scholars do is combat ideology. Unlike feminists they
do not combat ideology among the oppressed; but like feminists, they combat
ideology among their own class-in their case, the ruling class. The ideolog-
ical beliefs that they attack reassure members of the ruling class that op-
pressed groups can achieve "equality," or "justice," or "freedom" in
American society without a massive redistribution of power. Their aim is to
persuade people in power that violent protest by underprivileged people in
FUL xxiii-xxvii (1970); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, in THE SIGNS READER 6 (1983); Sarachild, The Consciousness Raising: A Radical Weapon,
in FEMINIST REVOLUTION 144 (1975).
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America is rational, justifiable, even inevitable. Their hope is that this may
erode the resolve of America's rulers to use repressive force against op-
pressed people; and the further hope, perhaps Utopian, is that this will em-
bolden such people to take their cause into their own hands. Critical legal
scholars are not, after all, guerrillas; they are sympathizers within the Ancien
Regime. They are not, perhaps, heroes-but they are not as timid as some.
If they lack the courage of their convictions, at least their convictions re-
quire courage. And I'm afraid-very much afraid-those convictions are
true.
